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Personhood and the Persistent 
Vegetative State 
Rev. Philip Smith, O.P. 
Father Smith is a faculty member in the philosophy department at 
Providence College in Rhode Island. 
The question of whether artificially administered nutntlOn and 
hydration should always be provided for patients in a persistent vegetative 
state (PVS) has sparked an intense and often bitter controversy. An 
important underlying issue in the dispute and the focus of this work is the 
kind oflife that is being sustained by the tube feeding. One approach to the 
question drives a wedge between person and body arguing that the PVS 
patient has died, but the remaining body still remains alive .. This view 
attaches little moral value to the vegetative body apart from the respect 
due to it because it once belonged to the former person. The ever-
perceptive Daniel Callahan describes this position as clearly as anyone. 
Callahan maintains that "the 'sanctity of life' has to be the sanctity of 
personhood, not merely the possession of a body." At the heart of one's 
quality oflife lie certain crucial potentialities for personhood. These "must 
at least encompass the capacity to reason, to have emotions, and to enter 
into relationships .... A person who has lost all of these capacities 
cannot, in any meaningful way, be called a 'person' any longer."2 In his 
discussion of tube feeding for the imminently dying, Callahan clearly 
states this dichotomy between personhood and body. The practice need 
not be continued because it does not provide "any genuine benefit to the 
patient; there is no meaningful life present. It is a mere body only, not an 
embodied person."3 What about those in a persistent vegetative state? 
Such patients have exhausted their potential for personhood because they 
have lost not only "neocortical brain functions" but also have lost "all 
capacities for personhood, though clinical death has not yet occurred".4 
I have deep philosophical reservations about the dualism implied in the 
dichotomy between person and body. Consequently, this article will offer 
a philosophical perspective on the nature of PVS life. Such an inquiry 
must encompass the empirical as well as the philosophical. While the exact 
relationship of the human biological structure to personhood remains a 
mystery, bodily life is nevertheless highly relevant for establishing the 
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presence of personhood. Persons do not exist apart from their bodies. 
Thus, the empirical provides the medical facts on the persistent vegetative 
state while the philosophical probes the meaning of these facts for the 
personhood of PVS patients. 
I have chosen St. Thomas Aquinas's philosophy as a framework for 
discussing the nature of PVS existence. Not only is his system as 
philosophically consistent as any other but its structure is well-suited for 
incorporating the empirical data. The fact that Aquinas's metaphysics and 
natural philosophy are rooted in the order that reason discovers in nature 
not only permits, but demands, that the relevant biological information be 
integrated into the philosophical probe of PVS existence.5 I will begin with 
a brief overview of Aquinas's understanding of person, continue with the 
biological data on the persistent vegetative state and conclude with my 
own position on the nature of PVS life. By way of background, a few 
general comments about the terminology involved in Aquinas's 
philosophy of person will be helpful for some readers. 
Aquinas's Anthropology 
Thomistic Terminology 
In Aquinas's metaphysics, all created being is divided into the categories 
of substance and accidents. In ordinary language, the difference between 
the two is the difference between things and their modifications. A 
substance refers to something which is complete in itself and able to exist 
on its own, e.g., a coat or a house . However, an accident can exist only as 
part of a substance. Color, an accident, can exist only in some object e.g., a 
red coat or a white house. 6 Moreover, every natural substance is also a 
composite, being made up of two internal principles: prime matter and 
substantial form. 
Of the two principles, substantial form is the more important. In living 
things, this form is called the soul or the first principle of life. The form 
determines that a being will be this particular kind of thing rather than 
another, e.g., a dog rather than a cat. Prime matter is the reality that is 
shaped by substantial form . Because it is the single organizing principle of 
a living organism, the substantial form is the source of its internal unity 
and the root of its specific activity and growth. This is the basis for the 
celebrated agere sequitur esse axiom: a thing acts according to its nature. 
Thus, while we cannot directly know the nature of a thing, we can find out 
something about it by observing its activities and by reasoning from them 
to the powers which produced them and ultimately to the nature of the 
thing itself. 7 
An additional point can be added here. Aquinas insisted that there has 
to be some relation between matter and form, i.e., matter must be 
organized in a suitable way before it can be specified by a particular form. 
For example, he held that the rational soul is the substantial form of the 
human person, but he insisted that the soul was not infused at fertilization. 
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In the initial stages of gestation, the matter is not organized well enough to 
receive the soul. Instead, the fetus is immediately animated by a vegetative 
soul, followed in turn by an animal or sensitive soul. Finally, when the 
matter is ready, the rational soul is infused.s 
Another distinction found in finite beings and important in Aquinas's 
thought is that between essense and existence, between what something is 
and the act by which it is. Some insight into this difficult doctrine can be 
derived from the ordinary use of language. If a child asks about the 
meaning of reindeer and dinosaur, an explanation of each can be given 
without adding that reindeer actually exist while dinosaurs do not. 
Meaning can be separated from existence. For Aquinas, essence refers to 
the meaning or definition of something and as such has no concrete 
existence. 9 For example, human nature does not exist apart from some 
specific person. Existence is the act which changes human nature from 
being an abstract concept into being a part of this particular person. For 
Aquinas, existence alone is truly real and the act of existing is "the act of all 
acts, the perfection of all perfections."10 With this brief background, we 
can now focus on Aquinas's notion of personhood. 
Concept of Person 
Aquinas places person at the very summit of material creation, a being 
which is the "most perfect in all of nature, that is, a subsistent individual of 
a rational nature". I I St. Thomas's view of rational nature explains his 
exalted notion of person. As a substance, a person is a combination of 
matter and form, more commonly referred to as a unity of body and soul. 
While every living organism has a soul, persons are set apart from the rest 
of the animate world because their souls are endowed with the spiritual 
faculties of intellect and will. Since the soul has these spiritual faculties 
which can operate independently of matter, the soul itself must also be 
spiritual and independent of the body, i.e., it can exist on its own. Thus, 
Aquinas concludes that God creates each soul with its own act of existence 
at the time of infusion into the body.J2 
However, Aquinas balances his emphasis on the spirituality and 
independence of the soul with his experience that a person exists and acts 
as a unity. The person who thinks and chooses is the same person who 
sleeps and eats . Aquinas could account for this integrated activity only if 
the human soul is the sole organizing principle of the body, i.e., is its 
substantial form. Since it has its own act of existence, the soul not only 
confers humanness on the body but also communicates its own existence 
to the bodily material, fashioning a person unified by sharing a common 
act of existence. The functional unity that is so evident in a person has its 
source in this underlying oneness. I) There can be no dichotomy between 
person and body in this anthropology. 
Persistent Vegetative State 
Medical Facts 
Since the persistent vegetative state involves permanent loss of brain 
May, 1990 51 
function, it will be useful to begin by comparing this state with that of total 
brain death. Basically, the difference between the two conditions is the 
difference between a severely impaired brain function and the complete 
absence of it. In its operations, different areas of the brain specialize in 
different activities. The higher human functions such as consciousness, 
choice, etc., come mainly from the cerebral cortex. The more vegetative 
activities such as spontaneous respiration, natural reflexes and the arousal 
system for the whole brain are rooted in the brain stem. The area of injury 
and the degree of damage distinguish the PVS condition from that of 
complete brain death. With the demise of the entire brain, all brain 
function, including that of the brain stem, disappears permanently. With 
the PVS condition, the irreversible loss of brain activity is confined 
primarily to the cerebral hemispheres, while the brain stem remains 
relatively unscathed and unable to carry out its vegetative functions .14 
The persistent vegetative state usually stems from a cardiac arrest or a 
respiratory attack which completely shuts down the blood flow (ischemia) 
or oxygen supply (hypoxia) to the brain, although the condition may also 
be caused by other factors , including head trauma. The cerebral cortex is 
much more sensitive to the lack of oxygen and blood and sustains 
permanent damage much more quickly than the brain stem does. If the 
blood flow or oxygen is cut off completely for more than six minutes, the 
cerebral cortex can suffer total and irreversible destruction. Unlike 
complete brain death , PVS patients do not develop the massive 
intracranial swelling which prevents circulation to the rest of the brain. 
Thus, their brain stems will not sustain permanent injury from a 
temporary hypoxia or ischemia. If the cerebral cortex is permanently 
destroyed , but the brain stem continues its functions, the patient will 
remain alive but in a persistent vegetative state.15 
After the cardiac or respiratory attack leading to the PVS condition, the 
victims generally have a temporary impairment of brain stem activity. 
They will often be comatose for a period of time, ranging from a few days 
to a few weeks. During this initial phase, they may require respiratory 
support. However the typical PVS patient soon comes out ofthe coma and 
stabilizes in the persistent vegetative state , characterized by open-eyed 
unconsciousness.16 As described by Jennet and Plum, "it is the discrepancy 
between prolonged periods of wakefulness and the absence of any 
behavioral or physiological evidence of critical function or mental activity 
which characterizes the vegetative state". 17 
Clinical tests on PVS patients reveal a range of activities which confirm 
the presence of an active brain stem. Though they may need respiratory 
assistance at first , most victoms are able to breathe on their own within a 
few days of the attack. They open their eyes at times and even go through 
sleep / awake cycles. Their pupils also react normally to light. Most PVS 
patients have normal cough and gag reflexes which add to their life span by 
enabling them to stave off potentially fatal respiratory infections. Some 
even retain their involuntary swallowing reflexes making it possible, at 
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least theoretically, to feed them by hand. However, given the enormous 
amount of time and effort involved in hand feeding, mot PVS patients 
received fluids and nourishment by tube. IS 
While neurological examinations confirm the presence of an active 
brain stem in the persistent vegetative state, the same tests clearly indicate 
the absence of any neocortical activity. PVS patients may follow particular 
people or objects with their eyes , but they make no attempt to convey 
messages through eye contact or head movement. Although apparently 
wide awake, they are not conscious of themselves or of their 
surroundings. 19 In Jennet and Plum's words, "what is common to patients 
in this vegetative, mindless state is that, as best can be judged behaviorally, 
the cerebral cortex is not functioning .... "20 
Diagnosis and Prognosis 
The degree of neocortical impairment following brain injury can run the 
gamut from mild to massive. The actual damage in any given victim can 
only be established by a battery of tests conducted over an extended span 
of time by neurological specialists. The task is not easy. As noted above, 
the PVS condition can arise from several factors. Different underlying 
causes ofthe brain damage can lead to different outlooks for recovery, e.g., 
some head traumas vs. hypoxia. Thus, Ronald Cranford concludes that 
"the prognosis about recovery of neurologic function, when the prognosis 
can be made, and its degree of certainty will vary considerably according to 
the underlying cause of the brain damage and the specific patho-
physiology".21 
In particular, great caution must be exercised before diagnosing any 
given PVS condition as being truly irreversible. Currently, there is no set of 
reliable clinical tests available so the neurologists can make that judgment 
with absolute certainty. Even when the current criteria have been applied 
correctly and by experts , there have been occasional well-documented 
instances of mistaken diagnosis . In these rare cases, patients diagnosed as 
being in a persistent vegetative state recovered full use of their mental 
faculties .22 
Once diagnosed as being PVS, what is the life expectancy of such a 
patient? That depends largely on a combination of two factors: the 
physical state of the patient and the attitude of family , physicians, health 
care facilities and society as a whole toward providing aggressive medical 
care. Young patients who have a strong natural resistance to infections and 
who have their cough and gag reflexes intact are much less susceptible to 
fatal respiratory infections than the elderly and the fragile . If treated 
aggressively with current medical technology, such patients can survive for 
years or even decades . However, their continued existence relies less on 
their physical condition than it does on attitudes toward treatment of 
medical complications in general and the artificial administration of food 
and water in particular. 23 The question of health care for PVS patients lies 
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outside the scope and purpose of this work, so a mere mention of its 
importance will have to suffice. As the number of such patients increases 
and the strain on medical resources mounts, the medical treatment of such 
individuals will be among the most pressing and difficult choices 
confronting society in the future. 
Relation to Other Mental States 
In light of what is known about the. persistent vegetative state, Cranford 
argues that this state must be clearly distinguished from two other 
neurological conditions: coma and profound dementia. Unlike the PVS, 
comatose patients are in a state of eyes-closed unconsciousness triggered 
by a severe impairment ofthe arousal system ofthe brain stem. In contrast 
to those in the vegetative state, coma patients often have seriously 
damaged cough, gag and swallowing reflexes. This reflex injury interferes 
with their ability to clear the passages of their throat and lungs and makes 
them vulnerable to infection. As Cranford notes, "This impairment leads 
to frequent, often fatal, respiratory infections - a common cause of death 
in comatose patients, and one of the major reasons why truly comatose 
patients do not experience the long-term survival period associated with 
the vegetative state".24 
Profound dementia, e.g., Alzheimer's disease, is similar to the persistent 
vegetative state in some respects. However, it differs from the PVS 
condition in two important ways. First , most dementias can scarcely be 
noticed during their initial stages but become progressively worse over the 
years. In contrast, the PVS happens within a space of minutes usually from 
a sudden cardiac or respiratory arrest and does not deteriorate with tpe 
passage of time. Secondly, dementia is rarely accompanied by a complete 
loss of consciousness or of the ability to relate to the surroundings. 
Persistent vegetative state patients do not have any self awareness. 25 
Cranford describes the difference like this: "Patients in a persistent 
vegetative state are not simply demented, but amented (a complete loss of 
mental functions)."26 With the basic medical facts in hand, we can turn to a 
philosophical analysis of the data to determine the status of PVS life . 
Critical Reflections 
Have PVS patients "lost all capacities for personhood" as Callahan 
argues? Or are such individuals still persons but in a severely truncated 
state of existence? Thomistic philosophy must address these questions in 
light of its concept of person. Just as a person comes into existence with the 
infusion of the soul, so also the person dies when the soul separates from 
the body. This latter event cannot be verified empirically, so the soul's 
absence must be linked to some physical measurement or clinical test. 
Since the human soul in its role as substantial form enables the person to 
exist and to function as a simple organism, its departure will be marked 
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by the irreversible disintegration of the physical basis for human unity and 
action. Relative to the status of PVS life, then, the crucial question the 
Thomistic philosopher must answer is: can the destruction of only an 
essential part of the body, e.g., the cerebral cortex, damage the body so 
severely that it is simply incapable of sustaining a human soul, even though 
the rest of the body remains intact and spontaneously alive? Since the issue 
revolves around brain-related criteria for death, I will frame my remarks in 
terms of total and partial brain death . 
Total Brain Death 
I find the arguments for equating total brain death with the death ofthe 
person persuasive for two main reasons: first, the medical data indicate 
that the brain is the physical organ responsible for regulating and 
integrating the body's vital activities; second, current clinical tests can 
determine accurately when the loss of brain function is complete and 
irreversible. Now, a brief comment on each qf these points. 
Human life entails the close interaction ofthree primary bodily systems: 
the central nervous, the cardiovascular and the respiratory. The 
permanent loss of function in anyone of these systems soon leads to a 
similar loss in the other two and to the disintegration of the organism as a 
whole. However, even though they are mutually interdependent, the brain 
is the organ which plays the crucial role in the body.27 An adequate 
discussion ofthe brain's influence is far beyond the scope ofthis work, so it 
will be enough merely to mention some areas of the brain which serve as 
control centers for various bodily systems and functions. Thought and 
choice come from the cerebral cortex, speech and spatial activity from 
regions within the association cortex, and emotions and memory from 
certain structures within the limbic system. The brain stem generates the 
signal for breathing and also assists in the regulation of circulation. 
Temperature control, sexual desires and hunger pangs reside in the more 
primitive hypothalamus. 28 This list could be expanded . However, the 
evidence leads to an almost universal agreement with Bernat's conclusion 
that the brain is the organ which "integrates, generates, interrelates and 
controls complex bodily activities".29 
Given its indispensable role in the body, it is reasonable to accept the 
brain as the critical organ for establishing the presence or the absence of 
the human soul. All the vital activities it controls cease completely when 
the entire brain suffers a total and irreversible loss of function . In terms of 
Thomistic philosophy, total brain death indicates that the physical basis 
for human unity and action has been destroyed. The remaining organism 
can no longer support the human soul. In short, when the whole brain dies, 
the soul leaves the body and the person dies. However, even given that 
total brain death can be equated with the soul's absence, can we be sure 
that the brain damage is complete and permanent in any particular 
patient? 
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The diagnosis of irreversibility can be complicated by the possible 
presence of such factors as drug-induced coma, young age, hypothermia, 
etc., which can cause a temporary, but reversible, suppression of all brain 
functions. 30 However, over the past two decades, medical organizations 
and individual groups have conducted major studies designed to refine and 
update the clinical tests for determining complete brain death and to avoid 
fatal mistakes. The consensus among physicians is almost unanimous. 
When carefully applied, the most recent criteria enable a physician to 
diagnose brain death accurately. The clinical findings are supported by 
autopsies disclosing that when the criteria of brain death are satisfied, the 
brain is dead and the patient cannot recover. 31 Thus, I find Veith et aI's 
conclusion about the tests for establishing brain death to be persuasive. 
"The validity of the criteria must be considered to have been established 
with as much certainly as is possible in biology or medicine."31 
Persistent Vegetative State 
The difference between the persistent vegetative state and complete 
brain death is the distinction between a severely impaired brain function 
and the total lack of it. There is a world of difference between the two. 
Unlike complete brain death, the arguments for neocortical death are far 
from conclusive. My disagreement with those who equate the PVS 
condition with personal death concerns the amount of physical damage 
the body can undergo and still be compatible with the spiritual soul. 
Advocates of PVS death contend that the irreversible destruction of only 
the cerebral cortex causes death by destroying all potentialities for 
personhood. I disagree with that conclusion. In its role as substantial form, 
the human soul unifies all the human functions into an integrated system. 
Since the PVS condition is accompanied by the loss of only the higher 
human activities, it does not completely destroy the body's ability to 
function as an organized entity. The brainstem remains intact generating 
vegetative activities, including spontaneous respiration. In my judgment, 
this partial loss of brain function is not damaging enough to force the 
soul's departure and thus not enough to cause death. 
Before accepting the radical implications of equating the PVS condition 
with the death of the patient, we need definitive answers to at least two 
important questions .33 First, can it be proven that the neocortex is solely 
responsible for controlling all higher human functions? That is not 
possible today. On the contrary, current brain research indicates that the 
cooperative efforts of several brain systems and regions may be needed for 
these human activities. Moreover, while rationality and freedom are the 
essential human characteristics, our entire human worth cannot be 
collapsed into our thoughts and choices. Second, even assuming a positive 
answer to the first question, can the irreversibility of the persistent 
vegetative state be diagnosed accurately? As noted above, there is not 
enough reliable evidence available today to provide a definitive answer 
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to this question. As Smith and Cranford insist, such evidence would have 
to provide "unequivocal certainty, substantiated by medical data and 
experience, empirically verifiable, and supported by autopsy studies 
confirming the clinical analysis . . . . Merely a severe dysfunctioning is 
insufficient evidence for pronouncing death".34 
The conclusion that PVS patients have not died does not resolve the 
issue of whether artificial nutrition and hydration should always be 
administered to them. It merely insists that no matter how fragile their 
grasp on life may be, such individuals are persons who must be treated with 
love and compassion, dignity and respect. Traditionally, health care 
efforts were considered extraordinary and morally optional if they were 
useless, too painful, too expensive or experienced as too burdensome. The 
question of tube feeding must be decided within that moral framework. 
The moral issue is not whether PVS patients can be kept alive but whether 
there is a moral obligation to do so. 
Conclusion 
This study has attempted to evaluate the status of PVS existence in the 
light of Thomistic anthropology. I have argued that the persistent 
vegetative state cannot be equated with personal death because it 
introduces an erroneous dichotomy between person and body. In effect, it 
reduces personhood to the rational or to wht can be consciously 
experienced. I have argued further that PVS brain damage does not 
completely destroy the body's unity and integrity and thus is not indicative 
of the soul's separation. . 
It is true that practically none of the PVS patients will e:ver regain 
consciousness or mental functions. However, their bodies remain intact, 
spontaneously alive and able to carry out a whole range of vegetative 
functions. While severely impaired, such patients retain enough functional 
integrity to be compatible with the human soul. This is not to minimize the 
health care problems PVS patients pose for society. It is enormous now 
and will continue to increase as their number grow and their demand on 
medical resourses mount. However, defining them out of existence is not 
the solution. 
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